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ABSTRACT 
Social capital has emerged as a key concept on the social sciences in 
general and political science/public policy in particular over the last 
two decades or so, because, by facilitating collective action among 
the actors, it leads to increased levels of performance in several 
public policy areas and public policy at large. In the case of Greece, 
the low level of social capital, at least since the late 1980s, tends to 
be regarded as a key problem of the domestic institutional 
infrastructure that crucially affects the level of performance in 
several public policy areas. In that respect, there is evidence to 
suggest that the low level of social capital is linked to the dominant 
role of rent-seeking behaviour of relatively small and strongly-tied 
interest groups in the policy process that inhibit policy learning and 
hence the reform process in several public policy areas. This paper 
presents evidence on the implications of the state of social capital in 
Greece for public policy-making from two policy areas, namely 
environmental and regional. 
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Social Capital and Public Policy in Greece 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social capital has relatively recently (Paraskevopoulos, 1997, 1998, 2001a-d; 
Lyberaki & Paraskevopoulos, 2002; Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002) emerged 
on the academic debate on public policy-making in Greece as a potentially 
crucial variable affecting the institutional and/or policy adaptation -policy 
change- processes, resulting from the Europeanization and/or modernization 
agenda. Despite the lack of historical/time series data on the level of social 
capital in Greece, there is some evidence to suggest that the relative “civicness” 
of the first post-authoritarianism period, i.e. 1974-1980s, seems to have been 
eroded by increasing levels of individualism, very low level of social trust and 
distrust in political institutions, that is very low level of social capital at large 
(see Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 2001; Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 2002; 
Sotiropoulos, 2004). The main task of this paper is twofold: first, to 
systematically measure/evaluate the level of social capital in Greece; and, 
second, to identify whether or not this is linked to levels of institutional 
performance and/or policy-making outcomes, in terms of policy change 
resulting from Europeanization and/or modernization processes. Thus, the first 
section of the paper establishes the link between the concept of social capital 
and the problematique of public policy-making in general. The second section 
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examines the theoretical and methodological approaches to the challenge of 
measurement of social capital. The third section presents the main findings 
with regard to the state of social capital in Greece from both macro-analytical, 
namely pan-European, and micro-analytical perspective. The fourth section 
investigates the implications of the state of social capital in Greece for public 
policy in general and policy change in particular with specific focus on two 
policy areas, namely environmental and regional. Finally, the final section 
presents the main conclusions with regard to the state of social capital in 
Greece and its implications for domestic public policy-making. 
 
2. Social Capital and Public Policy 
Social capital, defined as a combination of generalized trust and access to 
social networks, has become a key concept in the social sciences over the last 
two decades or so, because it correlates with normatively highly desirable 
qualitative features of liberal democracy, such as functioning democratic 
institutions, increased levels of civicness and citizens’ participation in social 
and/or public life, but most importantly with increased levels of performance in 
several policy areas, i.e. education, health, development, and public policy at 
large. Indeed, social capital has emerged on the public policy agenda as a 
crucial conceptual tool that, by facilitating ‘certain actions of actors within the 
structure’ (Coleman, 1988:98), leads to the crossing of the old schism between 
structure and culture. As a resource for action available to an actor, it is one 
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way of introducing social structure into the rational choice paradigm (ibid., 
1988:95; Ostrom, 1992, 1995a,b, 1998). Although Coleman’s1 (1990:300-302) 
definition of social capital as ‘a set of inherent social-structural resources in the 
social organization that constitute capital assets for the individual’ implies it 
refers to individual actors (persons), it has been acknowledged as a crucial 
factor for facilitating collective action among corporate actors as well: ‘because 
purposive organizations can be actors just as persons can, relations among 
corporate actors can constitute social capital for them as well’ (Coleman, 
1988:98). Thus, social capital is not of any individual or group. Rather, it is a 
relational concept that refers 'to features of social organization, such as trust, 
norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated action' (Putnam, 1993:167). Therefore, voluntary cooperation is 
easier in a community2 that has inherited a substantial stock of social capital: 
that is the pursuit of collective goods is not seen as in contradiction with the 
pursuit of maximizing individual or family group wealth. 
Subsequently, another main feature of social capital is that of a shared or public 
good, whereas conventional capital is considered to be a private good. 
Therefore, like all public goods, it tends to be undervalued and undersupplied 
by private agents, which means that social capital, more so than other forms of 
                                                 
1
 Though Coleman is considered the scholar who introduced and analysed the term, he credits Glenn C. 
Loury with introducing the concept into economics and identifying the social resources useful for the 
development of human capital. See J. Coleman, (1990:300-301). 
2
 S. Singleton and Michael Taylor defined community as: 'a set of people (a) with some shared beliefs, 
including normative beliefs and preferences, beyond those constituting their collective action problem, 
(b) with a more or less stable set of members, (c) who expect to continue interacting with one another 
for some time to come, and (d) whose relations are direct (unmediated by third parties) and multiplex' 
(1992:315). 
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capital, needs to be nurtured, supported and enhanced in order not to be 
depleted. To this end, the role of institutions is crucial. 
The relevance of social capital to almost all areas of public policy draws on its 
capacity for resolving problems of collective action, such as the provision of 
various forms of public goods, and avoiding a situation known as social trap 
(Rothstein, 2002:290;2005). Indeed, public goods, because they can be enjoyed 
by everyone regardless of whether he or she has contributed to their provision, 
can be seen as constituting prisoner’s dilemmas. Under ordinary circumstances, 
therefore, no one has an incentive to contribute to providing the public good, 
causing all to suffer. In a similar vein, in the logic of collective action (Olson, 
1971:2) the presumption that the possibility of a benefit for a group would be 
sufficient to generate collective action to achieve that benefit is challenged. 
Olson's argument is based on the assumption that one has little incentive to 
contribute voluntarily to the provision of a collective good, unless he or she 
could be excluded from the benefits of that good, once it is produced. What all 
these cases underline is ‘how perfectly rational individuals can produce, under 
some circumstances, outcomes that are not ''rational'' when viewed from the 
perspective of all those involved’ (Ostrom, 1990:6). The performance of all 
social institutions from international credit markets to modern national and 
regional governments depends on the way in which those dilemmas of 
collective action can be resolved (Putnam, 1993:164). The interesting part of 
these dilemmas is the irrelevance of traditional theories about rationality, which 
are based on the presumption that actors make choices according to their 
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preferences ordering to maximize utility. Yet, in dilemmas of collective action 
the choices made by agents actually depend on the expectation of what others 
will do (Rothstein, 2002:290). As D. Gambetta has pointed out, 'it is necessary 
not only to trust others before acting cooperatively, but also to believe that one 
is trusted by others' (1988:216). Indeed, norms of trust and reciprocity, as 
intrinsic elements of social capital, constitute the main tools for resolving 
collective action problems. 
Theoretical work on the refinement of the concept of social capital over the last 
decade has led to its de-construction into three separate and almost mutually 
exclusive typologies. A first is the notion of social capital as ‘bonding’. It refers 
to the inner strengths of primary social groups such as families, clans and 
neighbours in a community in defence of the group’s interests and in particular 
as basic coping mechanisms for individuals in times of natural disasters and 
man-made crisis and in the absence of institutions (Narayan, 1998). It is 
sometime referred to as ‘unsocial capital’ (Levi, 1996). A second notion, and 
most widely subscribed to, is social capital as ‘bridging’, by which it is meant 
the associational capacity of a community to express dense networks of social 
exchange, which are viewed as countering ‘bonding’ forces. Much of the 
empirical work, including a substantial body of comparative studies, aimed at 
measuring the stock of social capital in communities today is focused on 
‘bridging’ (Putnam, 2002; Edwards et. al., 2001). A third notion is that of 
social capital as ‘linking’. It refers to the mechanisms which enable a 
community’s associational capacity or ‘bridging’ social capital to express itself 
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through political behaviour, thus interacting with public institutions and 
contributing to the production of public goods and outcomes. This is the least 
researched of the three de-constructed notions of social capital, perhaps 
because it entails longitudinal rather than cross-sectional studies, while 
ultimately it is most critical for public policy aims. 
The crucial question from public policy’s point of view is whether or not trust 
and subsequently ‘bridging and linking’ social capital can be created, 
particularly where it is needed and in short supply. In this respect, a concern 
with regard to the role of the state in promoting collective action and building 
social capital through successful state/society synergies has emerged relatively 
recently, especially in the institutional literature (Ostrom, 1996). In that respect, 
the basic argument in the problematique of ‘crossing the great divide’ derives 
from the debate between the ‘endowments’ and the ‘constructability’ 
approaches to state/society synergies. The former adopts the disjunction 
“strong state-weak civil society” and emphasizes the dependence of successful 
state/society synergies on a pre-existing strong civil society and presence of 
substantial stock of social capital and therefore points to a long-run process for 
success. In this theoretical framework, the creation and destruction of social 
capital are marked by virtuous and vicious circles (Putnam, 1993:170) and, in 
this regard, this presumption has engendered criticisms in relation to its 
historicism and ‘path dependence’ logic (Boix and Posner, 1996; Goldberg, 
1996; Sabetti, 1996; Levi, 1996; Tarrow, 1996). Conversely, the latter stresses 
the possibility of social capital building in the medium term, through 
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synergistic relations between state, market and civil society (voluntary) 
institutions and points to the evidence of successful synergies -with a key role 
attributed to the state- from areas of the globe (i.e. Third World countries) 
where the presence of social capital is in demand (Evans, 1996). Overall, the 
institutional literature on the European experience seems to suggest that issues 
such as the structure and the degree of centralization of the state and the 
strength of civil society constitute the crucial parameters that determine the 
administrative capacity of the state and shape the public/private relations. Thus 
the main features of the state structure in the degrees of bureaucratization, 
centralization and clientelism can account for the way in which areas of public 
policy are regulated and the state/society relations are shaped (see Putnam 
1993, Boix & Posner 1996, Grote 1997, Paraskevopoulos 1998, 2001a-d, 
Paraskevopoulos & Leonardi, 2004). In sum, there is evidence to suggest that 
social capital, civil society and co-operative culture at large, as components of 
a governance paradigm that has become known as participatory governance, 
constitute key variables affecting the levels of effectiveness and efficiency in 
almost any area of public policy. (Warren, Thompson and Saegert, 2001; Opp 
and Gern, 1993; Campbell, 2000; Halpern, 2001; Woolcock, 2001; Healy, 
2001; Whitehead and Diderichsen, 2001; Paraskevopoulos and Leonardi, 
2004). Moreover, this is particularly evident in the areas of regional policy and 
local self governance at large, whereby social capital is widely considered as a 
crucial conceptual tool and intrinsic element of the concept of regionalism, 
namely the bottom up movement of localities towards local self-governance as 
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opposed to the top-down process of regionalization from above (see 
Paraskevopoulos, 1997). 
 
3. Measuring Social Capital: theoretical and methodological 
approaches 
The literature about the measurement of social capital suggests that the 
identification of social capital involves a primarily twofold process: first, the 
cultural dimension, that is the identification of trust through mainly mass 
survey data; and second, the structural dimension, namely the identification of 
networks of civic engagement through data on membership in voluntary-
community organizations (NGOs) (see inter alia Newton and Norris, 2000; 
Norris, 2000, 2001; Narayan and Cassidy, 2001; della Porta, 2000; Mishler and 
Rose, 2001; Uslaner, 2001; Putnam, 2002; Pharr and Putnam, 2000; Rothstein, 
2002; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001; van Deth, 2000, 2001; Whiteley, 1999; 
Herreros, 2004).     
However, this two-dimensional approach leads to a number of areas of concern 
with regard to the measurement of social capital internationally, across 
countries and/or across subjects/policy fields. These include: the distinction 
between formal and informal ties/networks; the distinction between ‘bridging’ 
and ‘bonding’ networks and hence among inclusive and exclusive forms of 
social capital; the distinction between altruistic (other-regarding - offering 
services outside the membership) and ‘egotistic’ (self-regarding) which exists 
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to further the interests of members networks (Boix and Posner, 1996); and the 
distinction between individual and societal-level effects (Putnam, 2000; 
Putnam, et. al., 2000; Norris, 2001; Newton and Norris, 2000). Thus, while it is 
widely accepted that the capturing of the structure-culture interplay should lie 
at the core and be intrinsic element of the process for the measurement of social 
capital, a wide variety of other variables/proxies directly or indirectly related to 
social capital, the so called determinant and outcome measures, have also been 
incorporated into the measurement exercise (Narayan and Cassidy (2001).  
Thus, as existing research suggests, social capital is an extremely complicated 
concept and therefore its investigation requires the development of a reliable 
and valid index, incorporating associational membership and associational 
activism measures, social trust, as well as determinant and outcome measures. 
For capturing the associational membership vis-à-vis associational activism 
distinction Norris (2001) has adopted a three-stage approach, culminating in a 
scale weighting active membership, passive membership and not belonging3. 
As for the determinant and outcome measures, there is an ever expanding 
literature which points to socio-psychological and identity measures (Whiteley, 
1999), such as life satisfaction, pride & identity, as well as communication 
                                                 
3
 While associational membership according to the World Values Survey (WVS) is measured by the 
typical question: [“I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one could you tell 
me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organization?”], the first stage refers to the development of a specific (VOL-ANY) measure that gives 
an overall summary of belonging to any of the categories of voluntary organizations. The second stage 
involves the so called (VOL-ORG) measure, which focuses on capturing the spread of multiple and/or 
overlapping memberships through estimations of the mean number of associational categories that 
people join. Finally, the third measure (VOL-ACT) involves the creation of a scale weighting active 
membership, passive membership and not belonging. For the investigation of social trust -despite the 
problematic/limited character of the measure- the question of the WVS [“Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people”] is 
widely acceptable. 
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variables, such as television viewership, papers readership and radio 
listenership (Norris, 2000) for the former and to perceptions and measures of 
corruption (della Porta, 2000), confidence in institutions (Newton and Norris, 
2000) and political interest (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001) for the latter. 
Nonetheless, although it has become clear from existing research that there 
seems to be an ambiguity/concern with regard to the logic of causality among 
the variables mentioned above, given the importance of the ‘linking’ form of 
social capital for public policy, the relation to the role of public institutions and 
the state’s institutional infrastructure at large is particularly crucial.  
In that respect, the so called institutional theory of trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 
2001; Rothstein, 2002) attributes a very important role to the perceptions of 
fairness and impartiality of public institutions on the part of citizens as a crucial 
variable/determinant affecting the creation of generalized trust and hence the 
building up of social capital. Given that what this theory implies is the 
importance of the principles of impartiality and universalism in public policy-
making in general and policy implementation in particular, the link to formal 
state institutions and hence to the ‘linking’ form of social capital becomes 
clear. This is particularly true for the universal welfare state as the main 
pillar/guarantor of universalism. In this framework, given that confidence in 
institutions is widely regarded as a very important measure/proxy for the 
identification of social capital, what really matters is not confidence in 
institutions in general, but rather confidence in the institutions mostly involved 
in the implementation of public policies, that is confidence in the -impartiality 
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of- the so called street-level bureaucracy. In a similar vein, Herreros (2004) 
points to the crucial role of formal social and political institutions -as providers 
of external solutions to dilemmas of collective action- in the creation of social 
capital in two important respects: first, a direct one, as guarantor of agreements, 
that is sanctioning agent; and second, an indirect one, as facilitator of increased 
participation in associations and hence of building social capital through the 
provision of selective incentives. While the former function refers to the role of 
social and political institutions as an impartial state (street-level) bureaucracy, 
the latter refers to the universal welfare state. Yet, this measure becomes 
relevant at the societal and cross-national and not at the individual level of 
analysis (Newton and Norris, 2000; Mishler and Rose, 2001). In other words, 
while institutional performance and not culture determines trust in institutions 
at the individual level, at the societal/national level social capital may play a 
crucial role as determinant of institutional performance that leads to trust in 
institutions at the individual level. Perceptions of corruption, such as those 
collected by Transparency International, are widely used as a very important 
measure/proxy of confidence in institutions and hence of social capital (della 
Porta, 2000). 
Finally, another matter related to both the confidence in institutions and 
citizens’ activism is the interconnectedness between social capital and 
participation/activism in politics. This relationship, however, is not as 
straightforward as it seems to be. In particular, only association membership 
appears to be positively related to political engagement, while the correlation 
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between social trust and political activism is very weak (van Deth, 2000, 2001). 
In sum, given all the above, the interconnectedness between social capital and 
political engagement is a very complicated one and, hence, under these 
circumstances, the latter may not be as good outcome measure or proxy for 
social capital identification as many might have hypothesized.  
In light of the above analysis, the categorization of indicators/measures and 
proxies that are widely used for the measurement of social capital may be as 
follows. 
 
Table 1. Indicators used in Social Capital research 
Determinant 
(Sources/Origins) Measures 
Social Capital  
Measures 
Outcome  
Measures 
 Socio-psychological and 
identity measures (life-
satisfaction, pride and 
identity) 
 
 Communication variables 
(television viewership, 
papers readership, radio 
listenership) 
 
 Demographic traits (age, 
gender, class, race, marital 
and parental status…) 
 
 Occupation status (working 
hours, kind of work, 
employment status…) 
 
 Education 
 Social Networks Membership 
(Voluntary – Associational 
- NGO memberships, 
activities, involvement, 
rates of engagement, work 
relations…) (Structural 
aspects) 
 
 Generalized (social) trust 
measures (Cultural aspects) 
 
 
 Well-being, happiness 
 
 Institutional performance and 
confidence in public 
institutions 
 
 Perceptions and measures of 
corruption 
 
 Political interest and political 
participation (voting, party 
membership, activities, 
intensity…) 
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4. The State of Social Capital in Greece 
While measuring social capital is not an easy research task/objective, in the 
case of Greece the lack of historical databases constitutes an additional 
impediment. Thus, research for this paper has relied on two main sources of 
data/surveys that became available relatively recently: the Special 
Eurobarometer 223 which has been carried out by the European Commission 
(DG-V) and released in the beginning of 2005 (Paraskevopoulos, 2005b); and 
the European Social Survey (ESS) (3rd wave) which -for Greece- was carried 
out by EKKE, the Greek Centre for Social Research, and released in 2003. 
Although both surveys provide rich databases for measuring social capital and 
are very similar in their findings, there are important differences in their sample 
size and coverage of specific variables that allow for differentiation in their 
analytical capacity. In that respect, the data from Eurobarometer 223 is used in 
this paper mainly for macro-analytical comparative purposes, that is for 
comparing Greece vis-à-vis the other EU member states on the basis of a social 
capital index. The ESS, on the other hand, involves generally larger samples 
and covers a wider variety of variables, including communication, control, trust 
in institutions and other crucial, especially for the case of Greece, variables, 
and therefore it provides for capturing the micro-foundations of social capital at 
the domestic level. In that respect, it is used for micro-analytical purposes, 
namely for the analysis of the specificities related to the composition of social 
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capital in Greece and its interconnectedness with other determinant and/or 
outcome variables. 
The social capital index involves the capturing of the nexus between the main 
aspects of social capital, namely structure and culture, through measures of 
associational membership and social trust. Measures of associational 
membership normally include membership of at least one voluntary 
organization (vol.any), a number of multiple organizational memberships 
(vol.org) and a combined score (vol.act) of active membership, passive 
membership and no membership at all in any category of organization (Norris, 
2001). The measurement of social trust, on the other hand, is based on the 
proportion responding “most people can be trusted” in each society. The 
construction of the social capital index on the basis of Eurobarometer 223 data, 
however, has been based on a combination between social trust and number of 
multiple organizational memberships (vol.org). This is because it was very 
difficult from the data provided to distinguish between active and passive 
memberships and therefore to end up with a cohesive combined score (vol.act). 
Nonetheless, we are confident that the measure of organizational memberships 
adequately captures the dynamism of associational membership across the EU 
member states. 
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Table 2. Social Capital Index 
Country N Social Trust 
Most people 
can be trusted 
Vol.Any Vol.Org Social Capital 
Index 
Social Trust x 
Vol.Org 
Sweden (SE) 993 0.65 0.93 2.80 1.82 
Denmark (DK) 1010 0.75 0.90 2.38 1.79 
Netherlands (NL) 1026 0.62 0.84 2.21 1.37 
Finland (FI) 1032 0.61 0.76 1.53 .93 
Luxembourg (LU) 384 0.31 0.78 1.87 .58 
United Kingdom (UK) 1290 0.36 0.56 1.06 .38 
Ireland (IE) 1067 0.34 0.59 1.07 .36 
Austria (AT) 995 0.33 0.59 1.02 .34 
Belgium (BE) 960 0.30 0.58 1.14 .34 
Germany (DE) 1505 0.34 0.56 0.98 .33 
Slovenia (SI) 1023 0.24 0.57 0.94 .23 
France (FR) 982 0.22 0.56 0.90 .20 
Spain (ES) 1001 0.36 0.29 0.46 .17 
Estonia (EE) 991 0.33 0.37 0.53 .17 
Malta (MT) 493 0.22 0.44 0.73 .16 
Italy (IT) 1031 0.22 0.33 0.48 .11 
Cyprus (CY) 466 0.19 0.39 0.60 .11 
Portugal (PT) 1048 0.24 0.25 0.32 .08 
Czech Republic (CZ) 1110 0.17 0.36 0.47 .08 
Hungary (HU) 991 0.25 0.21 0.26 .07 
Slovakia (SK) 1295 0.16 0.38 0.42 .07 
Greece (EL) 1009 0.18 0.26 0.31 .06 
Latvia (LV) 984 0.15 0.27 0.35 .05 
Lithuania (LT) 1005 0.14 0.22 0.28 .04 
Romania (RO) 986 0.17 0.19 0.24 .04 
Bulgaria (BG) 870 0.20 0.16 0.18 .04 
Poland (PL) 1020 0.10 0.25 0.34 .03 
EU15 15297 0.33 0.51 0.93 .31 
EU25 24774 0.30 0.47 0.82 .25 
NMS10 9390 0.15 0.28 0.38 .06 
Total 27008 0.29 0.45 0.80 .23 
Note: Explanation of variables. Social Trust: the proportion responding “most people can be trusted”. 
Vol. Any: the proportion of the adult population who say they belong to at least one category of 
voluntary organization. Vol.Org: the number of organizational sectors to which people belong. Source: 
EuroBarometer 62.2 (2004). Data weighted. 
 
Thus, from macro-analytical perspective, namely in comparison with the other 
EU member states, Greece’s position is depicted within a group of primarily 
Southern and CEE countries, demonstrating very low levels of social capital 
and capacities for collective action. Obviously, this is the outcome of Greece’s 
weakness in both the social capital components, namely social trust and 
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associational membership, which, additionally, seems to be closely associated 
with weaknesses in other crucial from public policy’s point of view 
determinant and/or outcome variables, such as social networks and access to 
and satisfaction from the quality of public services (see Paraskevopoulos, 
2005b). Thus, the overall state of social capital in Greece and particularly that 
of associational membership, viewed from a macro-analytical perspective, 
raises serious doubts about the post-Olympic games euphoria with regard to the 
development of the voluntary and NGOs sector, which was rooted in the 
increasing levels of volunteers’ participation in the games. This is particularly 
true, if one takes into account the additional factor of the low intensity of 
membership/participation (see Whiteley and Seyd, 2002), if any, in voluntary 
and civil society organizations, as becomes evident even from the descriptive 
statistics (see Eurobarometer 223 data). Finally, this state of social capital 
points to the limitations of the role played by other, primarily socializing-
related, variables, such as contacts with friends, colleagues etc., where Greece, 
along with other countries of Southern Europe, appears to be in a better 
position vis-à-vis the other EU member states (Paraskevopoulos, 2005b). 
As for the specificities of social capital in Greece based on the ESS data, 
despite the fact that ESS does not provide for income, social class and/or size 
of town identification that would allow for controlling for these types of 
variables, the logistic regressions between the dependent variables, namely 
social trust and associational membership, and all the other independent and 
control variables reveal the micro-foundations related to the composition of 
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social capital endowments and capacities of collaborative collective action in 
Greece. 
Table 3. Logistic regression, dependent variable: social trust 
Variables Coefficients 
TV watching (total time on average weekday)     .039 
          (.041)   
TV watching (news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday)   -.071 
          (.051)  
Radio listening (news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday)   .016 
          (.028) 
Newspaper reading (total time on average weekday)      -.017 
          (.059) 
Personal use of internet (e-mail/www)      .015 
          (.035) 
Fairness          .496*** 
          (.033)  
Political interest          -.131* 
          (.082) 
Trust in political institutions        .231 
          (.487) 
Trust in order institutions         .268 
          (.485) 
Trust in the European Parliament        .047 
          (.039) 
Trust in the United Nations        -.074** 
          (.032) 
Placement on left right scale        -.076** 
          (.034) 
Church attendance         .079 
          (.062) 
Associational membership        .284* 
          (.167) 
Gender           .353** 
          (.147) 
Education          -.007 
          (.057) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** Significant at 99 percent. ** Significant at 95 percent. * 
Significant at 90 percent. Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2003.   
   
Thus, as the model of table 3 reveals, the most important variables/predictors of 
the level of social trust are fairness, gender, placement on the left-right scale, 
associational membership, trust in international institutions, and particularly in 
the U.N. and political interest. In other words, the fairness of the society as a 
whole, being female rather than male, belonging to the left rather than the 
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rightwing of the political spectrum, having interest in politics and being a 
member of a voluntary association and rather distrustful towards international 
institutions have a positive impact on the probability of being trustful in 
Greece.  
Table 4. Logistic regression, dependent variable: associational membership 
Variables Coefficients 
TV watching (total time on average weekday)      -.154*** 
(.036)   
TV watching (news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday)    .119** 
          (.048)  
Radio listening (news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday)    .032 
          (.024) 
Newspaper reading (total time on average weekday)      .054 
          (.050) 
Personal use of internet (e-mail/www)       .043 
          (.030) 
Social trust          .047* 
          (.031)  
Fairness          -.070** 
          (.033)  
Political interest          -.285*** 
          (.071) 
Trust in political institutions        .016 
          (.038) 
Trust in order institutions         -.058* 
          (0.33) 
Trust in the European Parliament        .045 
          (.033) 
Trust in the United Nations        -.053* 
           (.028) 
Placement on left right scale        -.016 
           (.029) 
Church attendance         .019 
          (.057)  
Gender               -.662*** 
          (.130) 
Education          .355*** 
          (.051) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. *** Significant at 99 percent. ** Significant at 95 percent. * 
Significant at 90 percent. Source: European Social Survey (ESS), 2003. 
 
Additionally, as the model of table 4 where the dependent variable is 
associational membership demonstrates, the most important variables/ 
predictors of associational membership in Greece are TV viewing, in terms of 
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total time and news/politics watching, fairness, interest in politics, gender, level 
of education, social trust, trust in order and international institutions. In 
particular, as expected, TV viewing seems to be a crucial variable/predictor of 
associational membership and participation in civil society organizations at 
large, given that while TV viewing in general is clearly a negative predictor, 
news/politics watching appears to play a positive role (i.e., the more you watch 
the more you participate), as it has been already identified in the literature 
(Norris, 2000). The level of education, gender (male rather than female), 
political interest and social trust are also important predictors, while it is worth 
stressing that fairness and trust in order and international institutions are 
negative predictors, namely the less you believe in the fairness of society, as 
well as of order and international institutions, the more you participate.  
Overall, the following points deserve reference with regard to the specificities 
of social capital in Greece. First, Greece demonstrates important similarities 
with other countries of Western and/or Southern Europe, with regard to the role 
of control variables, such as education and gender, as predictors of social trust, 
associational membership and social capital at large. The same applies to other 
determinant and/or outcome variables, such as trust in institutions (see 
Christoforou, 2003, 2004; Herreros, 2004). Second, TV viewing constitutes a 
very important variable/predictor of the level of social capital, since it affects -
in varying ways- the level of associational membership and participation in the 
voluntary sector at large. Given the unregulated-problematic character of the 
TV industry and the comparatively high rates of TV viewing in Greece, there 
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might be grounds for drawing comparisons between the Greek and the U.S. 
cases (see Putnam, 2000), with regard to the role of TV viewing in civic 
malaise and the erosion of social capital at large. Third, although the end of the 
1980s is widely considered as a turning point, in terms of levels of political 
participation in the post-authoritarianism period (see Lyberaki and 
Paraskevopoulos, 2002; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Pappas, 2001), and what one 
might expect would be a shift from increased levels of party membership and 
interest in party politics at large towards interest in and membership of civil 
society and voluntary sector organizations, there is no evidence to support such 
a hypothesis. Indeed, civil society appears to be particularly weak in Greece in 
terms of both the level of membership and intensity of participation (see ESS 
2002-03 data). Finally, there seems to be no evidence to support the hypothesis 
about some sort of informal strength of civil society in Greece (see 
Sotiropoulos, 2004) either, given that surveys are generally capable of 
capturing even informal patterns of participation. Yet, what might best describe 
the phenomena Sotiropoulos (2004) refers to would be ad hoc, spontaneous and 
reactionary attitudes, albeit without any organizational structure and hence 
without continuity, with the exception of some local specificities, which 
undoubtedly exist. Indeed, there is some evidence (see Paraskevopoulos 1998, 
2001a-d) to suggest that informal types of collaboration between actors within 
networks may be an important variable affecting the strength of civil society 
and/or the level of administrative capacity, especially at the local level of 
governance in Greece, though the institutionalization of informal exchanges 
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remains a key issue, especially with regard to the continuity and efficiency in 
policy planning and implementation. 
 
5. From Social Networks to Policy Networks: social capital and 
domestic policy change 
Social capital is considered a key concept in the academic debate on the impact 
of Europeanization and/or modernization processes on domestic policy and 
institutional change. This is primarily because of its role in facilitating the 
learning process among actors within policy networks/policy communities, 
which is viewed as a fundamental precondition for domestic policy change. 
Although it is supposed to be linked to the social rather than the rational choice 
type of learning, it may be viewed as a conceptual tool for bridging the gap 
between the two approaches and in that sense, it may fit well with the so called 
“actor-centred” version of sociological institutionalism which is better 
equipped for capturing the actor (interests, preferences, identities) – structure 
(norms, institutions) interactions (see Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 2001a-d, 2004, 
2005a, 2006). 
The state of social capital in Greece has been identified as a key factor/variable 
linked to the blocking of the reform and policy-making processes at large in 
several policy areas from the economy (Lyberaki and Tsakalotos, 2002) to the 
environmental and regional policies (Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 2001a-d, 2004; 
Paraskevopoulos et.al., 2006). This is attributed to the fact that the family and 
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kinship-based, essentially “bonding” (that is “unsocial”), type of social capital, 
similar in many respects to the “amoral familism” identified by Banfield (1958) 
in Southern Italy, that had underpinned the spectacular economic growth in the 
1960s and 1970s with the support of the patronizing state (see Lyberaki and 
Tsakalotos, 2002), has gradually been replaced by another sort of “bonding”, 
that is unsocial, capital which is based on relatively small and strongly-tied 
interest groups. Given that the creation of these groups has been based on a 
variety of selective incentives (see Olson, 1971) and that rent-seeking 
behaviour is their dominant feature, they put important limitations to the “exit” 
and “voice” options of the actors, thus inhibiting learning and policy change in 
several policy areas (see Pelagidis, 2005). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest 
that the state of social capital in Greece constitutes a key variable affecting the 
reform process in public policy in two important respects. On the one hand, the 
low level of social trust and trust in institutions is linked to the absence of weak 
ties among the actors within social and/or policy networks that would facilitate 
the –crucial for the learning process- diffusion of information and knowledge 
(see Granovetter, 1973). Hence social and policy networks are characterized by 
the predominance of small, strongly-tied and rent-seeking-oriented interest 
groups which block the reform process. On the other hand, simultaneously, the 
low level of social capital/social trust crucially affects the level of other actors’ 
participation in policy networks, and hence inhibits the creation of advocacy 
coalitions and/or issue-specific policy networks, such as epistemic communities 
and independent think-tanks, that would facilitate the policy learning and 
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reform processes in public policy at large (see Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 
1993; Sabatier, 1999). In this way, the lack of social capital may actually play a 
key role in undermining crucial reforms in public policy-making, such as the 
adoption of new ideas originated in New Public Management, namely the 
creation of quasi markets through PPPs and PFIs in a wide variety of policy 
areas, such as education and health (see Le Grand, 2003). Thus, while the 
particular type of “bonding”-unsocial capital is considered as having facilitated 
a spectacular and of particular type economic growth during the 1960s and 
1970s, primarily based on family enterprises and a patronizing state (see 
Pagoulatos, 2003), it seems that it constitutes an impediment to the policy 
reform and adaptation processes in public policy in contemporary 
circumstances within an environment characterized by generally high 
transaction costs. In that respect, given that the EU level of governance -
formally at least- provides as the only option for actors’ “exit” and “voice” 
functions, this section presents evidence on the state of the reform process –
essentially the response to the pressures of Europeanization- in two crucial 
policy areas for Greece, namely environmental and regional. The empirical 
evidence derives from a recently completed comparative research study 
between Cohesion and CEE countries and its main focus was on policy 
structures, namely policy networks, as well as on outcomes of policy 
implementation (Paraskevopoulos, et.al. 2006).  
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5.1. Environmental Policy 
Environmental policy in general and waste management in particular is a policy 
area which perfectly reflects the weaknesses of the institutional and policy-
making structures related to the low level of social capital. In particular, rent-
seeking and anomic behaviour, facilitated by institutional deficiencies, such as 
the lack of a land registry system (see Paraskevopoulos, 2001a), has led to 
crucial environmental problems: namely, the degradation of the built 
environment in almost all urban areas; the increased levels of air pollution, 
mainly because of the huge expansion in the use of private cars; and land and 
water pollution, because of failures in the waste management policy 
(Paraskevopoulos et.al., 2006). Thus, although even the formulation of 
environmental policy as a coherent and distinct policy area in the second half of 
the 1980s was strongly influenced by the need for harmonisation of national 
legislation with EU rules, Greece is considered as belonging to the so called 
“latecomers” or “laggards” group of EU member states. The main institution 
responsible for the formulation and implementation of environment policy at 
the national level is the Ministry for the Environment, Spatial Planning and 
Public Works. However, given that policy-making is shared with other -
sectoral- Ministries, such as the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Culture and the Ministry of Commercial Marine, as well as, the lack of 
effective co-ordination mechanisms, the Greek environment ministry has been 
characterized as a "weak" one, if compared to the ministries of other EU 
member states, such as the Danish and British ones (see Paraskevopoulos et.al., 
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2006). Thus, the command-and-control type of regulation, which involves 
limited discretion and flexibility for the administrative actors, is the main 
characteristic of environmental policy in Greece. Yet, in this framework, 
several steps have been taken recently to increase flexibility and efficiency in 
monitoring and inspection procedures, such as the delegation of certain 
inspection, observation and accreditation functions to independent bodies 
(experts) or voluntary organizations-NGOs (see Paraskevopoulos et.al., 2006). 
In the area of waste management the lack of an integrated management/co-
ordination strategy that would link the national, regional and local levels of 
government on the one hand, and the intense conflict among social and 
institutional actors at the regional and local levels about the location of the 
disposal or recycling areas on the other -typical symptoms of the lack of social 
capital in any respect- create conditions of a mis-regulated policy-making 
environment, especially at the local level. With regard to the institutional 
infrastructure at the national (central state) level, this includes the EU directives 
which are enforced by insufficient trans-ministerial decisions and the law on 
“the protection of the environment”, which has a rather declarative character, 
resulting in a lack of effectiveness of the policy-making. Thus, although Greece 
has a good record of adopting EU legislation (in fact all the relevant Council 
Directives -75/442, 91/156, 94/62- have been transposed) there are serious 
delays in the process (4-6 years) and without thorough examination of the 
conditions and needs at the national level (e.g. through research and production 
of reports). It is indicative that there was a significant delay (7 years) for the 
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incorporation of the Packaging Waste Directive (94/62) into the Greek 
legislation and there are still several steps that have to be taken for its 
enforcement (e.g. set up of an organisation for alternative waste management 
schemes). 
With regard to policy –policy network– structures, as the case of the region of 
Attica which was selected for fieldwork -Social Network Analysis (SNA)- 
research, reveals, there are two main groups of actors. The first group 
comprises the most central actors which are primarily central state (i.e., 
Ministry for the Environment and Public Works-YPEHODE) and subnational 
actors, such as local government associations (i.e., ESDKNA TEDKNA), as 
well as, organizations of interest intermediation (i.e., Technical Chamber of 
Greece-TEE). The second -peripheral- group primarily consists of policy/issue-
specific professional associations, civil society organizations and small private 
research companies, such as the Hellenic Recovery and Recycling Association-
HERRA, the Ecological Recycling Association-ERA and the Hellenic Solid 
Waste Management Association-HSWMA). Overall, the fragmented structure 
of policy network in waste management arguably reflects the pathologies of the 
“pre-existing” institutional infrastructure –broadly defined- in Greece, within 
which the lack of social capital constitutes a key factor. These include statism, 
centralized and weak administrative structure, problematic state-society 
relations, weak civil society, accompanied by some reluctant steps towards 
institutional innovation (i.e. some involvement of civil society, 
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experts/professionals in the policy-making process) (Paraskevopoulos, et.al., 
2006).  
As far as the implementation of environment/waste management-related EU 
programmes and initiatives is concerned, the evidence from the implementation 
of the Regional Operation Programme (ROP) for 1994-99 (under CSF II) in 
Attica is indicative and underlines the consequences of the lack of social capital 
for policy implementation. In particular, the Sub-programme 1, corresponding 
to the strategic objective of ‘improving the environment and quality of life’ 
consistently demonstrates the lowest level of both absorption rate and level of 
physical completion among all the sub-programmes/strategic objectives of the 
ROP, while it should be stressed that the general picture emerging from the 
evaluation regarding the implementation of other sub-programmes of the ROP 
is positive. Additionally, and most importantly, the evaluation provides 
evidence about the significant underperformance (low level of 
accomplishment) of the specific measure (M.1.2) related to the waste 
management tasks of the ROP, which is attributed to the so called “social 
reactions” factor, namely to the reactionary attitudes towards the location of 
landfills (the well-known NIMBY syndrome) (see Paraskevopoulos et.al., 
2006). As for the actual accomplishment of policy objectives, the main waste 
management-related problem of the Attica region is two-fold: on the one hand, 
while the bulk (95%) of the estimated 3,500 tonnes of solid waste is disposed 
of to the sanitary landfill located in the Municipality of Ano Liosia, this landfill 
has already been saturated; and on the other hand, the remainder is disposed at 
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several small and uncontrolled landfills and dumpsites. As far as recycling is 
concerned, only an estimated 8% of the total municipal solid waste is directed 
into material recycling with a goal of increasing the amount of recycled waste 
to 25% by the end of 2006 (see Paraskevopoulos et.al., 2006).  
 
5.2. Regional Policy 
Although regional policy is a policy area mostly affected by the 
Europeanization almost since Greece’s accession into the EC/EU, the 
weaknesses of the domestic institutional infrastructure in general and the low 
level of social capital in particular are evident in both the level of non-state 
actors’ (i.e., civil society, experts etc.) participation in policy-making (policy 
network) and in the outcomes of policy implementation. Thus, although the 
interaction between EU pressures and domestic institutional structures has led 
to a series of important reforms of the domestic policy-making structure over 
the last 25 years, involving the strengthening of administrative capacity and 
increased participation of non-state actors, such as private sector and expertise, 
in policy-making, this has taken place primarily at the central state level, while 
the overall response of the domestic institutional structure to the challenges of 
Europeanization has been rather poor (see Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 2001a-d, 
2005a; Paaskevopoulos et.al., 2006). 
With regard to policy structures –policy network- the Southern Aegean Islands 
region, which was selected for fieldwork -Social Network Analysis- research, 
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may be seen as reflecting the reality of policy-making structure, given that it 
used to be considered as a rather front-runner, in relative terms, region, in terms 
of institutional capacity, and has been studied over a long period of time, given 
that the first wave of SNA research was conducted in the region to evaluate the 
implementation of the IMPs and the 1st CSF (see Paraskevopoulos, 1998, 
2001). Yet, the structure of the policy network demonstrates rather limited 
improvement, as far as institution-building and actors’ participation is 
concerned (see Paraskevopoulos, et. al., 2006). In particular, the policy network 
is characterized by the dominant role of state actors, that is central state 
(Ministry of Economy) or regional (Regional Secretariat and ROP Managing 
Authority), as well as by the upgraded role of the sub-regional development 
agencies, the chambers of commerce and industry and the local associations of 
municipalities and communes, mainly due to their participation in the ROP 
Monitoring Committee. Nonetheless, the participation of civil society actors 
and NGOs is minimal (see Paraskevopoulos, et. al., 2006). Overall, the main 
lessons to be drawn with regard to the policy structures –policy network- in 
regional policy are the following: first, the limited institutionalization of the 
region, despite the relatively positive policy-making environment initiated by 
Europeanization/Structural Funds; second, the slow pace of the learning 
process (in terms of institution-building and actors’ participation); and third, 
subsequently, the primarily single-loop type of the learning process (see 
Paraskevopoulos, et. al., 2006).  
  30
In relation to the evidence from policy implementation, as it emerges from the 
ex post evaluation on the implementation of the ROP (CSF II, 1994-99) of the 
Southern Aegean Islands and fieldwork research, despite the significant 
improvements in aspects of the planning process (i.e. consistency between 
general/main development goals and specific policy objectives), there are 
important and crucial weaknesses related to the implementation phase of the 
programme. This becomes particularly evident from the level of 
accomplishment with regard to the three strategic goals of the ROP, namely: 
the concentration of resources in the form of Specific Integrated Programmes; 
the expansion of private sector involvement in financing the ROP; and the 
support of problematic sectors in the region. In particular, the two Specific 
Integrated Programmes, that is on ‘tourist exploitation of sea and culture’ (Sub-
programme 1) and the ‘specific integrated programme for Leros isl.’ (Sub-
programme 6) are characterized by low level of both economic and physical 
completion. With regard to the goal of expanding the private sector 
involvement in the ROP, which actually is closely linked to the financing of the 
two specific integrated programmes mentioned above, the level of its 
accomplishment has been very poor up to 1999. Finally, there is evidence of 
serious deficiencies in the accomplishment of the third strategic goal of 
supporting the problematic sectors in the region. In particular, almost all of 
ROP’s actions focused on the problematic sectors (namely, water management, 
protection of physical and built environment, intra-regional communication, 
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power sufficiency and efficiency of public administration) demonstrate a 
generally poor level of accomplishment (see Paraskevopoulos, et. al., 2006). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Social capital has emerged as a key concept on the social sciences in general 
and political science/public policy in particular over the last two decades or so, 
because, by facilitating collective action among the actors, it leads to increased 
levels of performance in several public policy areas and public policy at large. 
In the case of Greece, although there is some evidence that a particular type of 
family and kinship-based “bonding” social capital might have underpinned the 
economic boom-growth of the 1960s and 1970s, the low level/lack of social 
capital, at least since the late 1980s, tends to be regarded as a key problem of 
the domestic institutional infrastructure that crucially affects the level of 
performance in several public policy areas. Indeed, from a macro-analytical, 
pan-European, comparative perspective Greece belongs to a group of generally 
poor, in terms of social capital, countries of South and Central-Eastern Europe, 
demonstrating low levels of performance in almost all the indicators, measures 
and proxies used for social capital measurement. From a micro-analytical point 
of view, with regard to the specificities of social capital in Greece, while there 
are similarities, in terms of the main variables/predictors of the level of social 
capital, between Greece and other countries of South and/or Western Europe, 
the role of TV viewing, especially in relation to the level of associational 
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membership, and trust in institutions seem to be particularly crucial variables 
for the level of social capital. In terms of the implications for public policy, 
there is evidence to suggest that the low level of social capital is closely linked 
to the dominant role of rent-seeking behaviour of relatively small and strongly-
tied interest groups in the policy process that inhibit policy learning and hence 
the reform process in several public policy areas. This has become evident in 
two crucial for Greece policy areas, namely environmental and regional, where, 
despite the pressures of Europeanization, there is evidence that the outcomes, in 
terms of institutional change and policy reform, are rather poor with serious 
implications for performance in policy implementation.  
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Appendix 
Coding 
 
Explanation/coding of the variables of tables 3 and 4 are as following: 
1) TV watching total time on average weekday: ordinal variable with range 0-7, 
0 indicating no time at all and 7 more than 3 hours.  
2) TV watching, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday: ordinal 
variable with range 0-7, 0 indicating no time at all and 7 more than 3 
hours.  
3) Radio listening, news/ politics/current affairs on average weekday: ordinal 
variable with range 0-7, 0 indicating no time at all and 7 more than 3 
hours.  
4) Newspaper reading, total time on average weekday: ordinal variable with 
range 0-7, 0 indicating no time at all and 7 more than 3 hours.  
5) Personal use of internet/e-mail/www: ordinal variable with range 0-7, 0 
indicating no access at home or work, and 7 every day.  
6) Social trust: ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 indicating “you can’t be too 
careful”, and 10 “most people can be trusted”.  
7) Fairness: ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 indicating “most people try to 
take advantage of you”, and 10 “most people try to be fair”.  
8) Interest in politics: ordinal variable with range 1-4, 1 indicating “very 
interested”, and 4 “not at all interested”. 9) Trust in political institutions: 
mean of trust in country’s parliament and politicians, ordinal variable with 
range 0-10, 0 indicating “no trust at all”, and 10 “complete trust”.  
10) Trust in order institutions: mean of trust in the legal system and the police, 
ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 indicating “no trust at all”, and 10 
“complete trust”.   
11) Trust in the European Parliament: ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 
indicating “no trust at all”, and 10 “complete trust”.  
12) Trust in the United Nations: ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 indicating 
“no trust at all”, and 10 “complete trust”.  
13) Placement on left-right scale: ordinal variable with range 0-10, 0 indicating 
left, and 10 right.  
14) Religion/church attendance: ordinal variable with range 1-7, 1 indicating 
every day, and 7 never.  
15) Associational membership: membership in any of the following categories 
of associations/organizations for the last 12 months: sports/outdoor 
activity club; cultural /hobby activity organisation; trade union; 
business/profession/farmers organisation; consumer/automobile 
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organisation; humanitarian organisation etc.; environmental/peace/animal 
organisation; religious/church organisation; political party; 
science/education/teacher organisation; social club etc.; other voluntary 
organisation. Coding: value 1, member of any of the associations, value 0, 
not member of an association.  
16) Gender: value 1, male; value 2, female.  
17) Education: ordinal variable with range 1-7, 1 indicating illiterate/not 
completed primary education, and 7 post-graduate degree.  
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